Angela Rayner – 2023 Speech on Security of Government Devices and TikTok

The speech made by Angela Rayner, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, in the House of Commons on 16 March 2023.

I welcome the statement and thank the Minister for advance sight of it. But once again the Government are late to the game. In August last year, Parliament closed its TikTok account. As the Minister has just said, in December the US banned TikTok from official devices, and nearly a month ago the European Commission followed suit. On 28 February, however, the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology said that the app was a matter of “personal choice.” She said, “We have no evidence”, and that a ban would be “very forthright”.

What has changed? Two weeks, two Ministers, two completely different policies later, and it is the same pattern over and over again: a Government behind the curve, with sticking-plaster solutions, forced to lurch into a U-turn at the last minute. We need a strong, clear- eyed and consistent approach—one that ensures that we can protect our national security and that puts us in a strong position to engage with states such as China where it is in our interest to do so, in areas such as climate change and trade.

The Minister announced a restriction on official devices to a pre-approved list of third-party apps and a ban on TikTok. How does the ban on TikTok differ from it simply not being on that approved list? Why is the ban limited only to central Government Departments? How will it apply, for example, to devolved Governments or Parliaments? Can the Ministry of Defence, for example, keep its account?

The Minister said that the TikTok ban is based on

“a specific risk with Government devices”.

Can he go a little further on that? What exactly is the specific risk and why does it apply only to official devices in central Government? Will the Minister tell us what advice has been issued to other Ministers, including those who already actively use TikTok? What criteria will be used for the list of pre-approved apps that he has announced today? Which apps will be included and which will not? On what grounds?

Today’s announcement feels like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. If the Minister was serious about overhauling security at the heart of Government, why was the review limited only to the use of third-party apps on Government devices? Why not carry out a root-and-branch review of the technology used by his colleagues? The reality is that this Government’s track record of upholding security at the heart of Government is appalling, from their chronic use of private emails to the hacking of the phone of the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss). Will the Minister say whether there were any discussions during this process about Ministers’ use of private messaging, such as WhatsApp, and email? Will he confirm that he will make it a priority to make good on promises to update the guidance on the use of private emails by Ministers, which is now a decade old?

In the Procurement Bill’s Second Reading debate, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), described the Government’s approach to tracking down security threats in our supply chain as “relentless whack-a-mole”. She said we needed a more systematic and proactive approach to identifying risks in the UK’s supply chain, especially when it comes to goods and services bought with taxpayers’ money. I agree with her; does the Minister?

If the Minister is truly serious about national security at the heart of Government, why did he vote against Labour’s amendments to the Procurement Bill that would have mandated that suppliers that pose a risk to the UK’s national security must be excluded from being granted taxpayers’ money? The Government have a duty to uphold the highest standards of security at the heart of Government. Today’s announcement is nothing but a temporary fix—a sticking plaster—while gaping holes remain in our national security. We must fix this problem; is the Minister committed to doing so?

Oliver Dowden

The right hon. Lady raised a large number of issues; I will try to address as many as I can and am happy to write to her on any that I do not cover.

First, the Government’s overall approach to national security is set out in the integrated review refresh that was published at the beginning of the week. In respect of China specifically, it sets out a three-pronged approach of protect, align and engage; this element of our activity clearly relates to protect.

The right hon. Lady asked why the decision has taken some time. We have always taken an evidence-based approach. I thought it was appropriate that we gather sufficient evidence and understand the nature of the problem. I did that in November. It is an appropriate way to deal with national security challenges and I will continue to take it.

The right hon. Lady asked about the limited list. We already have an approved list of apps but it does not apply to every Government Department. We are now ensuring that it applies across all Government Departments. I do not believe there is a risk extant at the moment; this is about ensuring that we continue to guard against risk on an ongoing basis.

The ban applies not just to central Government Departments but to all Government agencies, including arm’s length bodies. On the devolved Administrations, I have written to the leaders in Scotland and Wales and the appropriate officials in Northern Ireland.

In respect of Ministers, they receive extensive advice when they take office and are expected to follow that with all the devices they use. In respect of private messaging, we are updating the guidance on non-corporate communications to ensure that we have a consistent approach across Government, but, again, I do not believe that we have serious concerns on that.

Finally, on the right hon. Lady’s slightly overblown rhetorical point about Government taking action, I say gently to her that I have always been willing to take decisive action to protect national security. It is exactly the approach that I took in respect of banning Huawei from our 5G network before many of our allies did so. It is exactly the approach that I took within weeks of taking office in respect of Government surveillance devices on sensitive sites with Chinese technology on them. However, we must proceed with an evidence-based and proportionate approach. That is what will command public confidence and that is the approach that I am taking today.